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It is generally agreed that LSP translation requires considerable specialised subject 
matter knowledge, cf. e.g. Gutt (2000:173): 
 
Suppose the translator is dealing with technical material for some 
specialist audience without being expert himself/herself. In this case, 
both original and target audience may have similar specialist 
knowledge – but the translator may not. […] From the relevance-
theoretic perspective, it is a must that the translator have a good grasp 
of both the receptor and the original context. In some situations this 
may require substantial preparation and research.  
  
Besides specialised subject matter knowledge, LSP translation, like other types of 
translation, obviously also requires general world knowledge, knowledge of 
language (source and target), of genre and of translation processes. Knowledge 
within all of these spheres is necessary both in order to understand the meaning of a 
given LSP source text and to convey that meaning into the target language.  
  
Even though it is generally agreed that specialised subject matter knowledge is an 
important part of the goal of LSP translation training, there is no real consensus on 
how topics are best dealt with and incorporated into the curriculum. To what extent 
and how should subject matter be taught to students who are students of language 
and translation rather than students of e.g. law, economics or science? 
 
Kastberg (2002) focuses on the question of subject matter knowledge in relation to 
the teaching of technical translation and summarises and discusses the difference 
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between and appropriateness of what he finds to be the two approaches generally 
used in German and Danish translation schools: the deductive and the inductive 
approaches. The difference and aims of the two approaches are outlined by 
Kastberg as follows: 
 
The deductive approach means that the translation student will be 
taught or at least exposed to the basics of technical science. […] From 
this knowledge base the trainee translators are obviously supposed to 
derive the knowledge needed to understand and subsequently translate 
any given technical text. (2002:59)  
   
[In the inductive approach] […] the translation student is taught or 
exposed to a (usually) small number of technical disciplines. Based on 
this knowledge of individual disciplines, the student is then obviously 
supposed to understand and subsequently translate any given text. 
(2002:60) 
 
Kastberg concludes that both approaches are fundamentally problematic, partly 
because they do not necessarily prepare students for handling texts they will be 
faced with having to translate ‘in real life’ as professional translators. The reason is, 
of course, that the subject matter of such real-life texts will not always (and maybe 
even seldom) correspond to the technical science topics taught as part of the 
technical translation training curriculum. 
 
Instead, and in line with Driver & Oldham (1986), Kastberg proposes an alternative 
approach focusing on teaching methods that in his view will enable the trainee 
translator to cope with the content of – in principle – any technical text  
 
“[…] I propose a common denominator other than that of disciplines; 
namely the basic building blocks of disciplines with their 
representation in texts: information (2002:62). 
 
The focus, then, is shifted away from technical subjects and onto texts as carriers of 
information about technical subjects. The underlying principle of this proposed 
alternative approach is a conception of a curriculum as something that is not a body 
of knowledge but rather a programme of activities from which such knowledge can 
be acquired. The programme of activities proposed is basically centered on two 
partially overlapping dimensions (the first one of which we are going to focus on 
here): 
 
The first dimension sees information management as a dynamic tool 
for informational problem solving. Here, the students are not taught or 
exposed to, say, the discipline of ‘machinery’; instead they are trained 
intensively and systematically in how to recognize what specific 
information needs they have with regard to a given translation 
assignment and how to fulfil that need. (2002:62) (our emphasis) 
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Four phases are involved in the model proposed by Kastberg. In the first phase, the 
trainees are trained to recognize any information needs in relation to a specific 
translation assignment, i.e. what knowledge gaps do they feel they have in relation 
to the text at hand. In the second phase, the trainees are supposed to seek out any 
information needed to fill any knowledge gap from whatever source they can get 
access to. In the third phase the trainees are supposed to analyse the information 
gathered with regard to authenticity and authority. And finally in the fourth phase, 
the trainees are supposed in the translation process to make use of information 
gathered seen in relation e.g. to the skopos, target culture, genre, addressee, etc. of 
the translation (2002:63).  
 
As teachers of another type of LSP translation, legal translation, we know from 
experience that the question of subject matter knowledge in curriculum planning is 
a tricky one to handle. It goes without saying that, ideally, the overall goal of legal 
translation training, and hence of the curriculum planning, is to enable trainees to 
develop cognitive strategies that will allow them to reconstruct the context of any 
legal text they are faced with having to translate. Pursuing that goal by exposing 
translation trainees to the entire curriculum of – in our case –the law degrees of two 
different legal systems is simply not an option. Time and money are obvious 
reasons.  And we agree with Kastberg that the method of teaching – in our case -  
‘basic law’ or a selected small number of law subjects has its limitations, as this 
approach will not necessarily enable trainees when they become professional 
translators to translate any legal text irrespective of subject. We therefore 
sympathize to some extent with Kastberg’s remarks as to the feasibility of what he 
calls the inductive and the deductive approaches and with the goal of working 
towards a teaching methodology focusing on knowledge as something which is 
constructed along the way by learners rather than simply being transmitted to them 
by their teachers.  
 
However, it is difficult to judge from Kastberg’s description of the model the extent 
to which such a model would facilitate trainees’ development of cognitive abilities 
that will allow them to recognize information needs they may have in relation to a 
legal text and translation task at hand.  
 
To try to transpose the ideas of informational problem solving as a teaching 
methodology to our field, let us say that trainees are asked to work with the 
translation of case documents from English into Danish in which appear terms such 
as a Part 20 Claimant and Part 20 Particulars of Claim that are culturally specific 
to the English legal system. Trainees will most likely have no difficulty in 
recognizing that they have an information need in respect of such specialised terms, 
and should be able to work through the phases of locating, evaluating and using 
information to fill their knowledge gap as proposed by Kastberg. The idea is that on 
the strength of these activities trainees will go through a four-stage learning process 
adding to their ability to cope with other subject matter areas, the focus being on 
their competence in analogical transfer rather than on the teaching of subject matter 
knowledge. However, information needs cannot be restricted to the identification 
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and solving of terminological issues. There are other problem areas that must be 
identified by the trainee, too. 
 
So, what happens if the first phase – the recognition of the information need – is 
not initiated?  
 
2. Looking at trainee translations 
When analysing trainee translations1 of legal texts at the Faculty of Languages, 
Communication and Cultural Studies of the Copenhagen Business School (CBS) 
we find that, in fact, trainees often do not recognize their own information needs in 
the understanding and translation process. A natural conclusion is that if the 
trainees do not recognize a particular problem it may be related to their own 
particular understanding of the events described in the texts. This is not surprising 
considering that they are not members of the specialist speech community within 
which the text operates and therefore do not conceptualize the world on the basis of 
the same frames and scripts2 as those who do belong to that speech community. 
 
In other words trainees are in fact often convinced at the outset that they have 
achieved relevance in the process of understanding utterances in legal texts they are 
translating when in fact they have not. They will search for utterance meaning and 
stop too early in the process when they find a solution that is satisfactory, at least to 
them, and choose linguistic material in the target language that reflects their 
understanding. That is what we assume happened in the translation of (1) which, 
we believe, is an illustration of precisely such a situation where the trainees’ 
contextual assumptions about the situation involved do not allow them to arrive at 
the meaning intended. 
 
In the process of translating (1), which was part of an English sales contract 
between two businesses, about one-fifth, i.e. 11 our of a group of 47 BA students 
sitting for the written exams in a particular year, surprisingly produced Danish 
versions in which ‘right’ had become ‘duty’, as illustrated by (1a): 
 
 
(1) Nothing in this clause shall confer any right on the Buyer to return the 
goods. 
 
(1a) Intet i denne bestemmelse pålægger køber pligt til at tilbagelevere 
varerne. 
[Nothing in this clause shall impose a duty on the Buyer to return the 
goods] 
 
On the face of it, there is no reason why a particular right should become a 
particular duty in the translation. There is no doubt that if the trainees were asked 
out of context, they would never confuse the meaning of ‘duty’ with that of ‘right’.  
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The provision in (1) was part of a number of provisions with the purpose of 
safeguarding the interests of the stronger of the two parties to the contract, i.e. the 
seller. We take it, however, that the trainees’ general assumption schemes would be 
about the interests of consumers rather than about the interests of sellers. The 
reason is that they play the role of consumers themselves in their everyday lives. 
Such assumption schemes would interfere with their understanding of the intended 
meaning and prompt them to make inappropriate inferences about the ST and the 
situation behind the contract. In their translations it is therefore the interests of the 
buyer rather than those of the seller that are catered for3. There are certainly no 
grammatical or terminological difficulties, nor are there any linguistic ambiguities 
involved  in (1). 
 
This possibility of a mismatch between the relevance achieved by trainees as 
intermediaries between STs and TTs and the relevance intended by the ST sender 
may of course have many explanations. In (1), one explanation may be that trainees 
will readily disregard an intended and therefore relevant interpretation when it 
conflicts with their knowledge of the world and hence with their own perception of 
relevance.  
 
What trainees think they know, then, may be one factor blocking their recognition 
of their own information needs. Another reason for possible mismatches between 
trainee and ST sender relevance is that sentences in texts are often ambiguous in 
that the same linguistic units can be related to a set of different situations. The 
phenomenon is explained by Widdowson (1998:19) as follows:  
 
There are innumerable instances of textual imprecision and ambiguity 
in actual language use which simply pass unnoticed because we of 
course quite naturally complement what we read with what we know. 
It is true of all texts that we piece out their imperfections with our 
thoughts.  
 
In the following example, again from an English sales contract, the ambiguity is 
linked to the syntactic role played by the prepositional phrase ‘with the software’ 
which would allow the trainees to relate the sentence to different situations.  
 
Consider (2)  
 
(2) In purchasing the Goods, the Purchaser is granted a non-exclusive non-
transferable licence to use the software only on the equipment supplied 
by the Company with the software. 
 
where the prepositional phrase could, seen in isolation, be understood as specifying 
either ‘the equipment supplied’ or ‘the Company’. Syntactically, both versions are 
acceptable. (2) was in fact translated by some trainees (BA students) as (2a): 
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(2a) Ved køb af varerne bevilges køber en ikke-eksklusiv, ikke-
overdragelig tilladelse til at bruge softwaren kun på udstyr leveret af 
virksomheden som har softwaren 
 [... supplied by the Company which has the software] 
 
The trainees have chosen to translate the linguistic unit as they would e.g. ‘the man 
with the boots’. It is not possible to say whether the trainees have identified the 
ambiguity of the grammatical construction or not, but they do not seem to have 
recognized that their chosen way of interpreting the construction (with the 
prepositional phrase specifying the Company) would be an unlikely and much too 
imprecise way of achieving specification of a contract party in the text type 
involved. Besides, as one of the two contractual parties, the Company would 
already have been identified at the beginning of the contract text.  
 
The interplay between the different types of knowledge resources required in 
understanding utterances is sometimes fuzzy. And it seems that because of this 
multidimensionality of knowledge resources and the fuzziness involved in their 
interplay trainee translators are not necessarily able to recognize that they are in 
fact faced with a problem, what kind of problem it is, and what additional 
information they therefore need to elicit to understand and translate a given text.  
 
One of the tools that a reader may have when trying to understand a given text is 
knowledge of what the communicator may normally be assumed to be 
communicating about as well as how the communicator normally does that. Kramer 
(2003:179f) discusses the mutual context that parties to, say, a contract have. This 
mutual context consists of both their personal common ground and their communal 
common ground which they draw on for the interpretation of a contract entered into 
by them. The personal common ground is inferred from the communicators’ (the 
contract parties’) shared experience. In most cases this would not be accessible to a 
translator working with the translation of the contract. Rather, the question is how 
to assist our trainee translators in gaining access to what is referred to by Kramer as 
the communicators’ communal common ground. The so-called communal common 
ground must be inferred on the basis of the communicators’ membership of the 
same group (e.g. buyers and sellers in a particular industry), the usual way of doing 
things in that industry and the lawyers’ knowledge and techniques (since normally 
lawyers will have drafted the contract for them). The part of the communicators’ 
communal common ground which is independent of situation and industry is the 
lawyers’ knowledge and techniques and will therefore for our purposes be the most 
natural point of focus. 
 
In a simple communication situation it is common sense that speakers will need to 
express themselves in a way that will enable hearers to assign reference to entities 
and actions described. However, in legal texts, which have to function 
independently of the situation in which the texts are drafted, this requirement is 
particularly acute because in these texts the receiver will expect salient factors 
(such as agents and events) to be linguistically encoded with a high degree of 
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explicitness to facilitate the reference assignment process.  Explicitness or precision 
is an often mentioned characteristic feature of legal texts, cf. e.g. Garner (1994): 
 
Traditionally, lawyers have aimed for a type of ”precision” that results 
in a cumbersome style of writing, with many long sentences collapsing 
under the weight of qualifications. (Garner 1994:1) 
 
If a trainee has no or limited access to the communal common ground, i.e. 
knowledge of the subject matter and of lawyers’ techniques, it will hamper his or 
her chances of first of all detecting possible ambiguities and secondly, choosing the 
interpretation intended. (3) is an example which was to be translated by MA 
students from Danish into English, and again, as in (2),  the ambiguity problem is 
connected with the identification of the role played by a prepositional phrase:  
 
(3) Vedrørende spørgsmålet om rette værneting antog sagsøgeren først, at 
der i dette tilfælde var aftalt voldgift i London (og derfor indledte 
sagsøgeren en sådan voldgift [judgment]4 
 
In (3), the meaning of the prepositional phrase is ambiguous in the source language, 
and this ambiguity is represented in trainee translations (3a) and (3b) below, where 
(3a) is less likely even though it is not in any way ungrammatical or otherwise 
inappropriate in the co-text: 
 
(3a) With respect to the issue of proper venue, the claimant first assumed 
that in this case arbitration had been agreed in London, (and 
consequently, the claimant commenced such arbitration proceedings). 
 
(3b) With respect to the issue of proper venue, the claimant first assumed 
that in this case arbitration in London had been agreed (and 
consequently, the claimant commenced such arbitration proceedings). 
 
(3) conveys information about a particular legal action, namely arbitration. And as 
it appears from translations (3a) and (3b) this legal action can be related to two 
different types of situations. In (3a) reference is made to one type of situation, 
namely a situation involving arbitration which had been agreed in London. In (3b), 
on the other hand, reference is made to a type of situation involving arbitration 
which was to be conducted in London. The problem then relates to the 
identification of the role played by the prepositional phrase ‘in London’, i.e. 
whether it plays the role of specifying the place where the two parties initially 
negotiated and agreed the issue of arbitration proceedings (rather than court 
proceedings), or whether it plays the role of specifying the place where the 
arbitration proceedings, if any, were to be held. Seen in isolation, both (3a) and 
(3b) are entirely possible readings and we again suspect that the ambiguity was not 
even recognized and identified as a problem by the trainees translating (3). Thus, 
the trainees may well have processed (3) up to a point where relevance was 
achieved and then translated what they understood to be the meaning of (3). They 
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simply went ahead and chose a solution that seemed compatible with their 
knowledge of the world.  
 
A member of the intended target group, on the other hand, would have opted for the 
(3b) version based on the communal common ground that consists in knowing what 
arbitration proceedings are about and what sort of linguistic specifications are 
needed to achieve the purpose of arbitration. What trainees may not be able to 
deduce by themselves, but need to be made aware of, is that, in a legal context, (3b) 
will be the preferred reading by legal users of the text, the pragmatic reason being 
that the primary information need of such users relates to the place where 
arbitration was to be conducted5. With the (3a) version, the action (arbitration) 
described cannot be unambiguously identified, i.e. the (3a) interpretation does not 
enable the TT reader to assign reference to the arbitration proceedings referred to 
(and identify them as the London-based ones).   
 
Legal documents such as judgments and contracts are meant to be used by judges 
and lawyers as instruments of action in legal situations. For the communication to 
be successful the ability of the users to achieve precise reference assignment will 
therefore be decisive, and knowledge of this need combined with legal knowledge 
of the subject matter (arbitration) will be part of the communal ground taken for 
granted by the legal discourse community for the interpretive processing of legal 
texts. So before they can detect any problems of interpretation and their own 
information needs in order to be able to determine the relevance intended by the 
producer of the ST, our trainees need to have made this part of their own contextual 
assumptions. 
 
3. Legal knowledge and inferencing 
So far, we have tried to demonstrate that much depends on the successful 
implementation of the first phase of the activities-based curriculum discussed by 
Kastberg (2002), which is the identification by the translator trainee of his or her 
informational needs in relation to a given translation activity, and that without 
access to a certain amount of communal contextual assumptions, such identification 
may not be made.  
 
In the following we want to look a bit more closely at the kind of knowledge that is 
involved and the way in which it becomes part of the communal common ground 
of the members of the legal speech community. 
 
The effect of legal knowledge, i.e. knowledge of legal rules, on the way in which a 
legal text is understood is examined by Kjær (2000), and for this purpose she 
divides legal texts into three different types (2000:139-40):  
 
• descriptive texts which describe or comment on legal rules (textbooks, law 
reports, etc.) 
• constitutive texts which lay down legal rules (statutes, executive orders, 
contracts6 etc.) 
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• reproductive texts which apply legal rules (judgments, statements of case, 
etc.) 
 
Kjær assumes that  
 
Rule knowledge is of particular importance to the reader of 
reproductive texts, because legal rules are here only applied (neither 
stated nor explained). Descriptive texts describe legal rules. Therefore 
it can be expected that the rules are explicitly stated. Constitutive texts 
lay down legal rules, which on the face of it also seems to imply that 
they state the rules in extenso. [..…] (2000:140) 
 
Kjær discusses an example taken from a judgment, i.e. a reproductive text applying 
rules: 
 
The Plaintiffs have in support of their claim stated that the defendant 
was bound by his offer when LR accepted it 
 




and if ‘acceptance’  
 
then ‘contract’ 
   If ‘contract’   
 
 
then ‘binding effect’ 
 
 
and demonstrates the role played by rule knowledge and the understanding of the 
interrelations of legal concepts. The point is that the  ‘if-then-if-then’ relations are 
achieved by means of the so-called connecting concept of ‘contract’ which is 
implicit in the text, and thus inferred by the expert reader. Her claim is that only in 
descriptive, and to some extent constitutive, texts are such rules and relations 
explicitly stated, whereas in the case of reproductive texts the legal expert ‘co-
thinks’ the statutes underlying the argument of the judgment, cf. p. 149: 
 
My assumption is that he intuitively interprets the words of the text as 
lexical representations of rule fragments. Or more precisely, he 
understands the words as signals to him to infer relevant rule 
knowledge  
 
Since the legal translator is not reading the legal texts for the same purposes as the 
legal expert, it therefore could be argued that the same kind of full understanding is 
not necessary for the translator. However, the reliance of these texts on a rule 
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system which may be only implicitly stated nevertheless means that he or she still 
needs to perform a good deal of inferencing in order to first identify potential 
personal knowledge gaps of his or her own and then to arrive at the intended 
meaning of the source text. Thus, the trainee translator not only has to cope with 
the “normal” indeterminate nature of utterances, but also in the case of reproductive 
and to some extent constitutive texts, with the implicit reference to a rule system 
that may not be available to him or her.  
 
So, while legal texts are on the one hand subject to the particular requirement of 
explicitness to enable precise reference assignment, they are still like other texts 
characterised by elements of underdeterminacy. For their interpretation receivers 
consequently have to resort to pragmatic inferencing.  
 
One possible implication of the need to rely on knowledge of rules which are not 
explicit in the text is that the first phase of the activities, i.e. recognizing their own 
information needs, becomes even more difficult to implement for trainee translators 
without a basic knowledge of the rule system.  
 
Consequently, as we see it, for trainees to be able to identify the problems that they 
may have in understanding and translating legal texts they should be able to make 
inferences based on 
 
1. the legal situation described in the text, in particular the usual course of 
events in that type of situation (subject matter knowledge) 
2. the way in which legal experts normally express themselves in order to 
describe such situations and the reasons behind their linguistic choices, e.g. 
the explicitation of salient actors and events to enable reference assignment 
(genre knowledge based on subject matter knowledge) 
3. the way lawyers usually infer by co-thinking rules which may be only 
implicitly referred to (e.g. use of connecting concepts as proposed by Kjær 
(2000). 
 
And so we are back to the question of how to implement the intensive and 
systematic training of trainees in recognizing their informational needs. 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
As we see it the main purpose of legal translation teaching is to raise the trainees’ 
process awareness level thereby improving the self-monitoring and inferencing 
skills of the individual trainee rather than to aim for the fairly impossible, i.e. the 
legal knowledge level of the legal professional. And we agree with Kastberg that 
once trainees are able to embark on phase one (recognition of information need), 
the autonomous handling of terminology and terminological knowledge based on a 
programme of activities rather than on direct teaching of subject matter knowledge 
will no doubt allow trainees to develop long-term cognitive strategies of their own 
more easily. With respect to terminology in particular trainees are very early on in 
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the process automatically confronted with having to sort out terminological 
problems relating to culture specificity. In this case, they are aware that they will 
have to make a choice one way or the other. So in case of terminology, problems 
emerging in the translation process are evident to trainees, and they should be able 
to work with the activities outlined by Kastberg. 
 
But as we see it, the model proposed hinges on the need for trainees to be able to 
recognize their information gaps and on the way they are “trained intensively and 
systematically” in doing just that. And although our examples are based on 
relatively limited data, we think that they point to other types of problems that 
trainees meet, but are unable to recognize as such. They seem to lack sufficient 
knowledge of the legal system underlying or supporting, so to speak, the text to be 
translated.  
 
It goes without saying that we sympathize with Kastberg’s attempts to work 
towards a teaching methodology focusing on knowledge as something which is 
constructed along the way by learners rather than simply transmitted to them by 
their teachers. But because of the necessity in legal language of accessing the 
communicators’ communal ground in Kramer’s terminology and rule knowledge in 
Kjær’s terminology in order to make the proper pragmatic inferences, we fail to see 
how lift-off can be ensured for the trainees in phase one without some sort of 
scaffolding to support them in their own learning process, i.e. a legal knowledge 
structure. And as illustrated by our three examples, we must by necessity introduce 
trainees to a basic cross-section of legal topics and in the process focus on types of 
legal situations with legal actors performing legal actions at certain times, in certain 
manners etc and on how these actors and actions are described by legal 
communicators. The trainees need to have some sort of general overview to work 
from, otherwise they may not succeed in their efforts when trying to understand 
and ultimately translate legal texts. They cannot rely solely on the text to be 
translated, cf. e.g. Widdowson (1998:19): 
 
What interpretation involves is the relating of the language in the text 
to the schematic constructs of knowledge, belief and so on outside the 
text. [….]   
Co-textual connections are semantic in character, and are only relevant 
to the pragmatic process to the extent that they can be contextually 
realised. 
 
So despite the appealing aspects of Kastberg’s model, there is no avoiding a 
curriculum incorporating structured components that will to some degree enable the 
trainees to build up a legal knowledge scaffold of their own which can be fleshed 
out during their process of specialisation. Such components must include the study 
of descriptive texts where the who-where-when-etc. relations of legal situations are 
spelt out instead of being implicitly relied on. 
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1 Our data consist of translations produced by 3rd year BA students or 1st year MA students of 
English (LSP).  
2 See e.g. Scarpa (2002:142): […]’frames’, which deal with knowledge about the properties of 
objects […] and locations, and ’scripts’, which deal with knowledge about events and sequences of 
events […]. 
3 Cf. also Kussmaul’s misuse-of-top-down-knowledge-hypothesis (1995:35) 
4 (3) is a reduced version of a sentence appearing in a Danish judgment involving foreign parties. 
The full sentence reads as follows: Sagsøgerens advokat har vedrørende spørgsmålet om rette 
værneting anført, at sagsøgeren først antog, at der i dette tilfælde var aftalt voldgift i London og 
derfor indledte sådan voldgift. 
5 Cf.: Oxford Dictionary of Law: arbitration agreement: … No particular form is necessary, but 
the agreement should name the place of arbitration and … (1997:29) 
6 Although Kjær allows that contracts may be seen as constituting rules, she prefers to categorize 
them as belonging to the reproductive text type based on the claim that the contract ”is always 
formulated on the basis of rules constituted by statutes.” (2000:140, note 11). This does not seem 
to fit the Anglo-Saxon contract law picture, however. For our purposes we have therefore chosen 
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This article proposes to discuss a question which was prompted by an article 
‘Information and Documentation Management in the Training of Technical 
Translators – As opposed to Teaching Technical Science’ (Vol 2, No. 2 of this 
journal, 2002), by Peter Kastberg: Should the teaching of subject matter content to 
students of language and LSP translation be a thing of the past?  
 
Granted that specialised knowledge is necessary for the LSP translator to enable 
him or her to interpret and transfer a ST, this article seeks to discuss the routes 
towards the acquisition of this specialised knowledge and the alternative process 
model for information and documentation management proposed by Kastberg 
which is to form the basis of, in his case, the organisation of a technical translation 
training curriculum. As teachers involved in another type of LSP translation 
training, namely legal translation training, we want to consider the pros and cons of 
transferring this model to our field. 
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